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 This paper examines the impact of two models of constitutional design on Latin 
American politics.  It suggests that the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of 
presidentialism needs to move beyond a discussion of whether parliamentary systems last 
longer than presidential systems.  Constitutional design—the way that political systems 
assign the functions of government among the parts of government—not only affects 
democratic stability, but also the responsiveness, transparency, and effectiveness of 
political systems.  This essay argues that the checks and balances version of the 
separation of powers—one that allocates every function of government among two or 
more parts of government—has contributed not only to political instability, but also 
impaired political system performance in many countries in the region.  It also contends 
that most presidential systems possess elements of the old with the new separation of 
powers—a theory of constitutional design assigns one function of government to one part 
of government.  The essay presents evidence that the most successful political systems of 
the region—Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay—are those that depart most significantly 
from the checks and balances version of the separation of powers. 




 What are the principles of constitutional design in Latin America?  Do the 
presidential systems of this region mimic the structure and dynamics of the US political 
system?  What impact do these factors have on regime survivability and policy 
performance?  While we know a great deal about the constitutional basis and political 
operation of the US separation of powers system, we know a lot less about the 
institutional dynamics of 17 Central and South American presidential systems (as well as 
those of Cuba and the Dominican Republic).  Political scientists, for example, have 
analyzed the nature of executive-legislative relations and explored the distributional 
implications of electoral laws, but we know a lot less about, for example, the relations 
between the elected branches of government and the judiciary or the bureaucracy.1  And, 
constitutional lawyers have spent a lot less time examining cases and rulings to uncover 
the design principles of political systems, ones crucial for making sense of the 
architectural properties of the state.       
 Answering these questions is important because separation of powers systems in 
the region have not performed very well.  Dictatorship was the norm during 
approximately one-half of the country years during the twentieth century.2  Even now, 
when virtually all Latin Americans live in formally democratic systems, most have good 
reasons to complain about the quality of their political systems.  During the 1990s, 
Latinobarometer surveys indicate that less than 40 percent of those surveyed are very or 
partly satisfied with democracy in their countries; only in Costa Rica and Uruguay do 
these percentages exceed 60 percent.  In contrast, an average of 50 percent of the citizens 
of the fifteen countries of the European Union responds that they are very or partly 
satisfied with democracy.3  These systems also have not, again with a few exceptions, 
                                                 
1  Gerald L. Munck, “Democratic Politics in Latin America: New Debates and Research Frontiers”,  
 Annual Review of Political Science, 7 (2004), pp. 437-462. 
2  Peter H. Smith, “Los ciclos de la democracia en América Latina”, Política y Gobierno, 11 (2004),  
p. 200. 
3  Programa de las Naciones Unidas Para el Desarrollo, La Democracia en América Latina, New  
York, 2004, p. 164. 
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protected individual rights, perhaps the central objective of any constitutional order.  As 
the data on regime types show, authoritarian regimes of one type or another have ruled 
the countries for half of the twentieth century.  In the process, they have violated the civil 
rights of their citizens and occasionally killed large numbers of them.  In Guatemala, by 
the far country with the worst human rights record, the armed forces and paramilitary 
groups killed the vast majority of an estimated 200,000, mostly indigenous, citizens 
between 1960 and 1996. 
In this essay, I show that the short answer to the first two questions is that the 
constitutional design of Latin American countries is a mix of the old and new separation 
of powers.  If the hallmark of James Madison’s theory of government is entrusting each 
function of government to two or more parts of government, then some Latin American 
constitutions do follow in the footsteps of perhaps the most influential of the American 
Federalists.4  Some, like the Argentine constitution of 1853, are replicas of the 
Philadelphia constitution.  Yet, most presidential constitutions do not have more than a 
limited resemblance to the US charter.  By the early twentieth century, constitutional 
engineers in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras borrowed practices like ministerial 
interpellation and the congressional designation of cabinet ministers from parliamentary 
systems to prevent the arbitrary use of executive power.5  During the twentieth century, 
quite a few political systems also developed constitutional designs similar to what Bruce 
Ackerman calls the new separation of powers.6  Instead of making two or more parts of 
government responsible for each function of government, they reformed their 
constitutions to minimize institutional overlap of governmental functions.  Indeed, the 
most successful cases of presidential government in Latin America—Chile, Costa Rica, 
and Uruguay—are the systems that depart most from the Madisonian version of the 
separation of powers.     
                                                 
4  Alexander Hamilton / James Madison / John Jay in: Benjamin F. Wright (ed.) The Federalist,  
 New York, 2002, pp. 336-58 (essay numbers 47-50, especially no. 51 [“Checks and Balances”]). 
5  William S. Stokes, “Parliamentary Government in Latin America”, American Political Science  
Review 39 (1945) pp. 522-36. 
6  Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers”, Harvard Law Review, 113 (2000), pp. 634- 
727. 
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 This short paper consists of three sections.  The first presents a balance sheet of 
research on the merits and demerits of presidential and parliamentary systems.  I begin 
here because any effort to assess the performance of separations of powers systems must 
incorporate the findings of perhaps the most intellectually productive vein of research on 
these political systems, that of why presidential systems appear to be less supportive of 
democratic stability than parliamentary systems.  Yet, I argue that the focus on executive-
legislative relations neglects to analyze issues of institutional design vital for not only 
understanding why parliamentary systems last longer than presidential ones, but also to 
understand why some political systems perform better than others.  The second section, 
as a result, examines alternative models of constitutional design to broaden the debate 
about the goals and aims of constitutional systems.  The third looks at the development of 
different combinations of the old and new separation of powers in Latin America.  Here, I 
present some evidence about my underlying hypothesis that the new separation of powers 
is more conducive to democratic stability and policy effectiveness.  The final section of 
the paper summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications. 
Presidential and Parliamentary Government: A Balance Sheet
Comparisons between presidential and parliamentary systems are one of the big 
topics of comparative politics and of constitutional law.  Yet, it is not something we 
began to study systematically until the last several decades of the twentieth century.  
Sure, before World War II, some scholars wrote case studies that we still read today.  
Walter Bagehot published The English Constitution (1867), in which he analyzed how 
the locus of power had shifted from the monarchy to the Houses of Parliament in 
nineteenth century England.7  Inspired by Bagehot, Woodrow Wilson wrote 
Congressional Government, a study critical of the operation of the US system of the 
separation of powers.8  For Wilson, dispersing responsibility over government between 
the two elected branches of government only undermined accountability and policy 
effectiveness.  In the 1920s, Carl Schmitt published The Crisis of Parliamentary 
                                                 
7  Paul Smith (ed.), Bagehot, The English Constitution, Cambridge, 2001, 291pp. 
8  Woodrow H. Wilson, Congressional Government. 2d ed, Boston, 1885, 333pp. 
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Democracy, a still widely read indictment of making executive authority dependent upon 
placating fickle parliamentary majorities.9   
This, of course, is only a selective list of relevant books and studies.  It does, 
however, make the point that the classics of constitutional design were more implicitly 
than explicitly comparative.  As a result, the study of constitutional design did not 
compare presidential and parliamentary governments.  Students of the US political 
system focused on the operation of its components.  They never examined the operation 
of other presidential systems to understand, for example, how differences in presidential 
powers shaped the performance of political systems.  Outside of a limited number of 
comparisons with the English political system, there also were no efforts to compare 
presidential and parliamentary forms of government.  Analysts of European 
parliamentary systems made a number of notable contributions about the way different 
types of parliamentary systems worked, but they too eschewed comparison with 
separation of powers systems.10
 In the 1980s, Juan Linz put the debate on constitutional forms back on the 
discussion table.11  He argues that presidential systems are inherently less stable than 
parliamentary ones.  Linz makes a number of provocative arguments, two of which I 
highlight here.  First, he suggests that divided government often leads to inter-branch 
conflict, an outcome that does not occur in parliamentary systems.  Elected independently 
of the legislature, the president can end up with very little legislative support, either 
                                                 
9  Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, München, 1926,  
90pp. 
10  There are a large number of important contributions here.  See Arend Lijphart, Democracies:  
Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, 1984  
as well as his: Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six  
Countries, New Haven, 1999.  Finally, see George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political  
Institutions Work, Princeton, 2002. 
11  Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference”, in Juan J.  
Linz / Arturo Valenzuela (ed.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, 
Baltimore 1994, pp. 3-90.  This circulated in unpublished form for almost 10 years prior the 
publication in 1994.  A shorter version appeared as Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, 
Journal of Democracy 1 (1990), pp. 51-69. 
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because his party obtains only a minority of seats in congressional elections or because 
his co-partisans stop supporting his bills.  So-called “irresponsible” legislative majorities 
can emerge, ones that appear to obstruct the president while offering little leadership on 
pressing national problems.  In the best of outcomes, both branches compromise over 
policy and thus reduce the basis for discord.  In the worst case, both branches can play 
confront each other and lawmaking can bog down.  The inability to produce laws—what 
Linz calls paralysis—can then be the backdrop to regime breakdown.   
 Second, the problem of “dual legitimacies” can foment or even create conflict 
between the two elected branches of government.  Each can claim to represent the 
popular will.  Independently of whether paralysis exists, competition between the 
branches of government can escalate into a confrontation over which part of government 
best represents the popular will.  Paralysis or executive-legislative rivalry can be the 
backdrop to one branch of government’s assault on the other branches of government.  
Though legislatures occasionally win these struggles, it is much more common for 
presidents to defy legislative constraints on their authority.  The history of democratic 
breakdown is littered with defeated legislatures and the concomitant rise of arbitrary 
executives.  Contrary to Madison’s fears about the legislature’s abuse of authority, the 
breakdown of democracy is about the executive’s abuse of his authority.   
These two problems are unique to presidential systems.  Minority governments—
the functional equivalent of divided government in presidential government—are quite 
common in parliamentary systems.  Kaare Strøm estimates that 36.4 percent of all 
parliamentary governments were minority governments between 1945 and 1982.12  
Unlike divided governments, minority governments are rarely associated with regime 
breakdowns.  They are the products of strategic compromises, ones where certain parties 
prefer not to join the cabinet, but nevertheless offer the executive support of some or 
many of his proposals.  Minority governments are thus different from divided 
governments in presidential systems because they command a more predictable amount 
of legislative support than a president during divided government.  Moreover, as soon as 
                                                 
12  Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge, 1990, p. 61. 
Visiting Resource Professor Papers LLILAS, The University of Texas at Austin http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/llilas/
 7
parliamentary support evaporates, the cabinet falls and either a new coalition forms or 
new elections are called.   
 The dual legitimacies problem is much less severe in parliamentary systems.  In a 
parliamentary system, the executive is the agent of a legislative majority, which in turn is 
the people’s representative (s).  Sure, the Prime Minister can claim to be the people’s 
representative, even if he had lost the confidence of his parliamentary majority.  But, 
unlike in presidential systems, the executive in a parliamentary system would be forced to 
demonstrate the accuracy of this claim in a general election.  Simply put, there is no 
government unless the executive commands the support of a parliamentary majority.   
 What does the evidence say?  One group of studies casts doubt on whether 
presidential systems are any more brittle than parliamentary ones.  Matthew Shugart and 
John Carey show that the number of parliamentary breakdowns is larger than the number 
of presidential failures during the twentieth century.13  Yet, a simple listing of cases is 
unconvincing because it does not control for the number of countries and years that 
countries had each type of political system.  Among Third World cases, Shugart and 
Carey find that differences in breakdown rates between regime types are minimal: 52.2 
percent of presidential systems vs. 59.1 percent of parliamentary regimes broke down 
during the twentieth century (and that have remained democratic for two or more 
elections).  Timothy J. Power and Mark Gasiorowski echo these findings; they examine 
the duration of 56 transitions to democratic rule in the Third World between 1930 and 
1995. 14  They find that 75 percent of transitions to parliamentary systems do not 
collapse, a figure that is not statistically different from the 69 percent of presidential 
systems that survive.  Both sets of calculations of political system failure in the Third 
World do not include developed countries, a fact that allows them to disregard more than 
a dozen successful cases of democratic consolidation. 
                                                 
13  Matthew S. Shugart / John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and  
Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 40-1. 
14  Timothy J. Power / Mark Gasiorowski, “Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the  
Third World”, Comparative Political Studies 30 (1997), pp. 123-55. 
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 A second group of studies upholds Linz’s arguments.  Alfred Stepan and Cindy 
Skach show that only 18 percent of parliamentary systems among 53 non-OECD 
countries that were democratic for at least one year between 1973 and 1989 experienced a 
coup.15  In contrast, 40 percent of presidential systems during this period witnessed a 
coup.  Josep Colomer’s Political Institutions is particularly noteworthy because it looks 
at all democratic regimes since the late nineteenth century.16  Colomer also draws a 
useful distinction between Westminister parliamentary systems that use first-past-the-post 
electoral systems and parliamentary systems that use proportional representation.  Since 
the first wave of democracy (1874-1943), the success rate of majoritarian parliamentary 
systems is 42 percent.  The success of presidential and semi-presidential ones is 56 
percent.  The success rate of proportional parliamentary systems is 69 percent.   
 Colomer’s observations are particularly welcome because they address Donald 
Horowitz’s potentially devastating criticism of Linz’s arguments.  Drawing upon the 
troubled history of Westminister systems in Africa and Asia, Horowitz argues that 
parliamentary majorities can rule at the expense of opposition parties and turn themselves 
into dictatorships.17  As Colomer’s simple percentages show, majoritarian parliamentary 
systems are the least stable because of their winner takes all political dynamic.  In the 
absence of power-sharing arrangements, opposition forces can have few incentives to 
respect democratic arrangements.  
Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub, and Sebastian Saiegh use a dataset of 
all democracies between 1946 and 1999 in the most systematic of all studies comparing 
the stability of presidential and parliamentary systems.18  They show that the probability 
                                                 
15  Alfred Stepan / Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation:  
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism,” World Politics 46 (1993), pp. 1-22. 
16  Josep Colomer, Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice, Oxford, 2001. 
17  Donald L. Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems”, Journal of Democracy 1 (1990), pp. 73-9.   
For Linz’s reply, see his “The Virtues of Parliamentarism”, Journal of Democracy 1: 4 (1990), pp. 
84-91. 
Adam Przeworski / José Antonio Cheibub, / Sebastian Saiegh, “Government Coalitions and 
Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism”, British Journal of Political 
Science 34 (2004), pp. 578. 
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that a parliamentary democracy will breakdown in a given year is slightly more than 1 
percent.  In contrast, the probability that a presidential democracy will breakdown is 
approximately 20 times greater.  In earlier work, Przeworski and his colleagues 
demonstrate that presidential systems are more brittle than parliamentary systems, even 
after controlling for levels of economic development.19
Critics of presidentialism therefore appear to be more right than wrong.  
Separations of powers systems are less stable.  Nevertheless, the jury is still out on some 
key issues.  Even after a decade and a half of cross-national research (and valuable case-
study research, little of which I discuss in this essay), we still do not know what causes 
presidential regimes to collapse.  Let me quickly review some of the potential causal 
mechanisms before suggesting that the focus on executive-legislative relations may not 
be the only way to think about why separation of powers systems do not seem to work 
very well. 
Scott Mainwaring is the first attempt to test Linz’s argument about divided 
government leading to paralysis.20  He uses the standard measure of the effective number 
of parties as a rough proxy for divided government among countries that have been 
continuously democratic for at least 25 years between 1945 and 1992.  Only one of these 
countries was a multi-party presidential system (Chile between 1933 and 1973); the other 
3 have been two-party systems (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela).  In contrast, José 
Antonio Cheibub (2004) examines 727 country years in 23 presidential democracies 
between 1945 and 1999 to show that the relationship between the number of parties and 
breakdown is not linear.  Breakdown is more likely in presidential systems with 2 or 
fewer parties or with 3 to 5 parties.  Similarly, Scott Morgernstern and Pilar Domingo 
show that coups are just as frequent in presidential systems where the executive does and 
does not have a legislative majority.21  In a sample of 9 (or half) of Latin American 
                                                 
19  Adam Przeworski / Michael E. Alvarez / José Antonio Cheibub / Fernando Limongi, Democracy  
and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge,  
2000, pp. 128-35. 
20  Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 26: 2 (1993), pp. 198-228. 
21  Scott Morgernstern / Pilar Domingo, “The Success of Presidentialism? Breaking Gridlock in  
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countries during different periods of the twentieth century, 17 and 21 percent of majority 
and minority governments fell to coups, respectively.   
The number of parties and background conditions like electoral formulae turn out 
not to be very good proxies for divided government. Two-party systems are just as likely 
to breakdown as certain types of multiparty presidential systems.  Multipartism has not 
proven to be an obstacle in parliamentary systems; many of the most stable and best 
performing political systems have been multiparty parliamentary systems.  Indeed, Josep 
Colomer and Gabriel Negretto argue that institutional engineers should make presidents 
more responsive to the median legislator to emulate the success of multiparty presidential 
systems.22  Ideological distance—and, in the worst cases, polarization—probably is the 
cause of gridlock and breakdown.  Competition between two highly disciplined and 
ideologically divergent parties can be just as destructive as the rivalry between several 
such parties.   
Research does and does not raise doubts about whether divided government leads 
to policy paralysis and then to breakdown.  While not directly concerned with regime 
breakdown, Mark P. Jones shows that executive-legislative conflict increases as the size 
of the pro-government’s legislative contingent declines in a sample of 14 Latin American 
countries between 1984 and the mid-1990s.23  Przeworski, Cheibub, and Saiegh’s study 
argues that divided government does not lead to breakdown. This study is noteworthy not 
only because it uses the most comprehensive database of regime breakdowns available, 
but also because it tries to measure the legislative success of presidents, something that 
no previous group of researchers had tried to measure cross-nationally.  It is true, they 
find, that parliamentary executives get more of their legislative program passed than 
presidents do.  Based on a sample of 335 years in 20 parliamentary democracies between 
1945 and 1999, Przeworski, Cheibub, and Saiegh estimate that prime ministers got 80.15 
                                                                                                                                                 
Presidential Regimes”, in: Diego Valadés / José María Serna (coordinadores), El Gobierno en  
América Latina: ¿Presidencialismo o Parlamentarismo? México City, 2000, pp. 95-132. 
22  Josep Colomer /  Gabriel Negretto, “Can Presidentialism Work like Parlamentarism?”,  
Government and Opposition (2005), pp. 60-89. 
23  Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies, Notre Dame, 1995,  
pp. 39-52. 
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percent of their bills enacted in parliament.  For a smaller sample, for one containing 175 
country years in 9 Latin American countries, they find that presidents got 62.63 percent 
of their bills approved in the legislature.  On the basis of these findings, they argue that 
presidential systems are surprisingly successful.  Even single minority (61.34 percent) or 
coalition minority presidents (53.03 percent) get most of their legislation passed.  So, 
they conclude, paralysis is unlikely be the cause of breakdown. 
 There are good reasons, nevertheless, to doubt the validity of these findings.  
First, the sample size is restricted.  They have information about the legislative success of 
executives for 36 percent (or 175 out of 485 country years) of democratic country years 
in presidential systems.  Second, the sample is biased in favor of longstanding 
presidential systems.  More than half of these country years—56 percent to be exact—
occur in 3 presidential success stories: Costa Rica (26 years), the US (43 years), and 
Venezuela (29 years).  If the average executive in these systems gets most of his bills 
passed and that total is lower than in parliamentary systems, it is important to ask whether 
the legislative success rate of presidents is even lower for a more representative sample of 
presidential governments and lower still for the cases that undergo regime collapse.  
Third, the sample of cases ignores an important transformation in the way presidential 
systems resolve political stalemates.  Before 1978, a military coup was the way to 
overcome gridlock.  Between 1978 and 2003, a combination of street protests and 
executive-legislative conflict has prompted 19 percent (or 14 out of 74) of all presidents 
to tender their resignations before Congress before their terms expire.24  Interestingly, 
separation of powers systems have found a way of settling conflicts, one that echoes the 
way prime ministers leave government when they lose a parliamentary vote of 
confidence.    
Several things are clear from this brief review of studies of executive-legislative 
conflict.  First, presidential systems are more likely to collapse than parliamentary 
systems.  Second, levels of economic development and inequality are more important 
                                                 
24  Gabriel L. Negretto, “Minority Governments and Types of Presidential Systems in Latin 
 America,” Latin American Politics and Society, forthcoming, Fall 2006. 
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conditioners of regime success.25  This is an important point: while constitutional forms 
count, they are one of several factors that shape political stability.  Third, the ideological 
distance between parties seems to be both an intuitively and empirically plausible cause 
of breakdown, and one meriting a systematic test.  The divided government leads to 
paralysis thesis and then to a military coup explanation is also plausible, but thus far 
remains unsubstantiated.  Even if Przeworski, Cheibub, and Saiegh turn out to be wrong, 
their study suggests that the critics of presidential government have to assemble databases 
of legislative productivity to show that policy paralysis precedes regime collapse.  Most 
importantly, we still need to know why presidential systems breakdown more often than 
parliamentary systems.  And, conversely, we need to understand why some presidential 
systems like the Costa Rican perform better than most of their regional counterparts. 
Models of Constitutional Design
 A limitation of the very productive line of research on executive-legislative 
relations is that the explanadum is narrow.  Regime continuity is unquestionably a key 
criterion for assessing the performance of constitutional forms.  Indeed, focusing on 
whether executives have or do not have stable legislative support can sideline other aims 
of constitutional government, including the protection of individual liberty.  The 
unification of executive and legislative power is, after all, an example of the 
concentration of power.  James Madison was not the first to warn that the concentration 
of power can lead to tyranny.  The focus on executive-legislative relations can therefore 
overemphasize the importance of decisiveness—just one of the properties of good 
government. 
Constitutional design should focus on several goals.  Responsiveness to public 
opinion is an important criterion, one about which I will not say very much at all at the 
present.  So is the promotion of individual liberty, to which I alluded in my reference to 
James Madison.  Maintaining democratic stability is obviously another goal.  Indeed, a 
regime breakdown can lead to the violation of liberty.  Finally, the effectiveness and 
efficacy of public policy is another. 
                                                 
25  In addition to the book by Przeworski / Alvarez / Cheibub / Limongi cited above, see Carles Boix,  
Democracy and Redistribution, Cambridge, 2003. 
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Decisiveness, liberty, responsiveness, and policy effectiveness can be thought of 
as the central goals of constitutional design.  And constitutional design is more than just 
an issue of institutional operation.  Institutional analysis—a big issue in comparative 
political science—tends to focus on the impact of rules on political areas in carefully 
delimited arenas.  The debate on presidential vs. parliamentary government, for example, 
only focuses on how electoral laws and the powers of the presidency make it easier or 
harder to enact laws.  To date, this debate has not been part of a broader discussion of 
how best to integrate the branches and institutions of the state to maximize not one, but 
several aims, of government. 
Constitutional design is therefore about a broader set of topics.  It is about 
assigning the functions of government among the parts of government.  It invokes meta-
theoretical conceptions of public power.  These principles emerge as properties that 
constitutional systems display in the way they weave the functions of government 
together.  It is the courts that typically articulate these principles when they arbitrate 
disputes between the branches and organs of the state.  Jurisprudence then unifies rulings, 
precedents, and interpretations into a body of meta-theoretical design principles that 
provide theoretical coherence to the structure of government. 
There are several models of how to integrate the parts of government.  
Parliamentary sovereignty is one.  This is a design that evolved in the Old World.  As 
monarchs gradually lost power to popularly elected assemblies in the nineteenth century, 
parliaments became the principle lawmaking branch of government.  Though 
parliamentary sovereignty is a legacy that Britain left in its colonies, it is not one that 
structures the relations between the organs of the state in Latin American countries.  As a 
result, I will not have much to say about parliamentary sovereignty in this essay other 
than this principle of constitutional design has been, until recently, the dominant feature 
of the English political system and that of Scandinavia.26
                                                 
26  Vernon Bogdanor, “Constitutional Reform in Britain: The Quiet Revolution”, Annual Review of  
Political Science, 8 (2005), pp. 73-98 analyzes the development of parliamentary sovereignty in  
England and how institutional reforms over the past decade have changed the English  
constitutional tradition.  For a recent assessment of parliamentary government, see Kaare Strøm /  
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A second and much more common meta-theory of power in the Americas is the 
checks and balances version of the separation of powers.  To prevent tyranny, each 
function of government is divided among two or more parts of government.  If a unified 
state, one where the powers of government are concentrated in one part of government, 
possesses the unity to oppress the body politic, then fragmenting the state is the way to 
protect individual liberty.  According to Madison, responsibility for the multiple 
functions of government must be shared among officeholders, each of whom will check 
the power of the other.     
The US political system, the embodiment of Madison’s theory of government, 
fragments political power.  Its executive is weak.  He has no special powers to set the 
legislative agenda.  He cannot declare states of siege.  He basically has, to quote Robert 
Neustadt, “the power to persuade.”27  The US president also faces a Congress that is 
solely responsible for setting its agenda.  Congressional committees oversee the executive 
and often contest the president, especially on domestic issues.  Congressmen often serve 
in the House or the Senate for long periods of time and acquire the policy expertise to 
challenge the executive.  An independent court exists to arbitrate relations between the 
branches of government, one that constantly reaffirms the theory of checks and balances 
and thus reproduces the constitutional basis of the struggle between the parts of 
government.   
A third model of constitutional design is what Ackerman calls the new separation 
of powers.  In his path-breaking study (see footnote 5), Ackerman suggests that political 
systems adopt functional specialization as their core principle of constitutional design.  
Instead of splitting each function of government between two or more parts of 
government, he recommends assigning each function of government to a single part of 
government.  This principle of constitutional design emphasizes the careful delimitation 
of the authority among the organs of the state.  Like in the old separation of powers, the 
multiplicity of state agencies prevents the concentration of power that can lead to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wolgang C. Müller / Torbjörn Bergman (eds.) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary  
Democracies, Oxford, 2003, 764pp. 
27  Robert E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, New York, 1960. 
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tyranny.  Unlike the theory of checks and balances, functional specialization reduces 
conflict and allegedly leads to a more efficient running of the state.  By empowering each 
part of government to pursue a specific function of government, the new separation of 
powers enables the state as a whole to remain democratic, to protect individual liberty, 
and to have a unity of purpose often lost with the old separation of powers.     
The political system of Germany is a good example of functional specialization.  
A popularly elected Bundestag (lower house of parliament) selects the Chancellor (prime 
minister) and his cabinet.  It, however, is not sovereign in all affairs.  The Bundestag 
cannot enact laws affecting the internal administration of the Länder (federal states) 
without the consent of the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), which is an agent of 
the states.  Prior to circulation of the Euro in 2002, the Bundesbank was solely 
responsible for monetary policy.  A host of other public or quasi-public institutions were 
responsible for policy in specific domains.  A Constitutional Court interprets the Basic 
Law; among other functions, it polices the boundaries between the branches and organs 
of the state.28  So, like in the US, state power is fragmented in Germany.  Unlike the US, 
however, the parts of government do not share responsibility for every function of 
government.  Instead, the German political system assigns a function of government to 
each part of government.   
The Old and New Separation of Powers in Latin America 
A hasty examination of the constitutional history of Latin America suggests that 
constitutional engineers copied the US constitution.  All countries do have separation of 
powers systems where the president is independently elected of the legislature.  As a 
result, it could be argued that they accepted the validity of the checks and balances theory 
of public power. 
                                                 
28  Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semisovereign State,  
Philadelphia, 1987, is the English language source that most forcefully makes this point without,  
however, mentioning the new separation of powers.  For a recent assessment of Katzenstein’s  
argument, see Simon Green / William E. Paterson (eds.), Governance in Contemporary Germany:  
the Semisovereign State Revisited, Cambridge, 2005.   
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There is some evidence for this claim.  The 1853 Argentine constitution and the 
1857 (and even the 1917) Mexican constitution do look remarkably like the US 
constitution.  Juan Bautista Alberdi, the great Argentine constitutional thinker, modeled 
the Argentine constitution of 1853 on the US federal charter.29  The quasi-socialist 
reputation of the 1917 Mexican constitution is deceiving.  It preserves the 1857 
constitution’s call for a weak executive, though the 1917 charter did strengthen the 
presidency by empowering the chief executive to veto legislative acts (while also 
allowing each house of Congress to override the president’s veto if two-thirds of all 
legislators agreed to do so).  Seventy years of one-party dictatorship by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) concealed this.  Democratization since the 1990s, however, 
has swiftly led to the reactivation of the checks and balances in the 1917 constitution.30   
Even the 1853 Argentine constitution, however, departs from the checks and 
balances version of the separation of powers.  It simultaneously empowers a more 
powerful executive, and one more dependent upon provincial governments.  On the one 
hand, it endows the national executive with the power of federal intervention in the 
provinces.  When public order is threatened, the president can dissolve a provincial 
government.  This was a power that, for partisan reasons, presidents greatly abused.31  
The overthrow of Argentine democracy in 1930 and the subsequent rise of populism also 
led to the subordination of Congress and the judiciary for much of the twentieth century.  
An irresponsible system of revenue sharing also has made the federal government 
responsible for financing provincial spending over which they have little control, a 
                                                 
29  Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases, Buenos Aires, 1852. 
30  Jeffrey Weldon, “Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico”, in: Scott Mainwaring /  
Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds) Presidencialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge, 
1997, pp. 225-58 was perhaps to see that it was unified government that made the Mexican 
president so apparently strong.  Also, see Fabrice Lehoucq, et al., “Political Institutions, 
Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico,” Working Paper, Latin American 
Research Network Paper No. 512, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
31  Anne Louise Potter, “The Failure of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-1930: An Institutional  
Perspective,” Journal of Latin American Studies 13 (1981), pp. 81-109. 
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situation that national governments find impossible to change because constitutional 
reform requires approval by a majority of provinces.32
Most other Latin American constitutions are different combinations of 
presidential and parliamentary government, ones that upset the careful balance of checks 
and balances of the US constitution.  Virtually all Latin American constitutions empower 
chief executives to suspend the constitutional order, a power notably absent in the US 
constitution.33  Especially in the twentieth century, constitutional engineers have given 
chief executives special legislative powers, ones borrowed from European parliamentary 
systems.  Examples include allowing the chief executive to convene extraordinary 
sessions of the legislature in which he sets its agenda.  Other powers include special 
decree powers, including the right to issue laws, subject only to legislative rejection 
within a certain time frame.34  Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, institutional 
engineers also gave legislatures the power to interpellate and to dismiss cabinet ministers.  
This “parliamentarization” of presidential government, to quote the term William Stokes 
coined 60 years ago (and cited in the introduction), seems to have led to the development 
of bizarre combinations of the executive rigidity that Linz decries in presidential systems 
and the legislative irresponsibility that both Schmitt and Giovanni Sartori criticize in 
parliamentary systems.35
In contrast to the US, executives in most presidential systems mimic the behavior 
of their counterparts in multiparty parliamentary systems.  Though systematic data is 
lacking for most of the twentieth century, available information suggests that coalition 
government is very much the norm in the region.  If half of all governments in 1984 were 
single party majority ones, they have become a distinct minority by the end of the 1990s.  
                                                 
32  Pablo Spiller / Mariano Tommasi, The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transaction  
Theory and an Application to Argentina, Cambridge, forthcoming. 
33  See Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America,  
Pittsburgh, 1993 as well as Diego Valadés, La Dictadura Constitucional en América Latina,  
México, 1974. 
34  John M. Carey / Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds.), Executive Decree Authority, Cambridge, 1998. 
35  Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives,  
and Outcomes, New York, 1994, pp. 110-1. 
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More than 70 percent of all governments relied upon legislative coalitions by 2000, ones 
where the executive was head of a coalition drawn from parties with legislative 
representation.36  If an alleged virtue of presidentialism is that it promotes executive 
stability, then it is worth noting that cabinets do not appear to be any less stable in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems.37  Related research shows that presidents, like 
prime ministers, consciously make cabinet appointments to build support for bills in 
Congress.38   
Political instability also seems to have encouraged constitutional reformers to 
make perhaps the single most important departure from the old separation of powers.  If 
the checks and balances theory of political power turns every administrative agency into 
peculiar combinations of executive and legislative delegation of authority,39 a number of 
separation of power systems in the Americas have established autonomous institutes to 
circumvent the incessant conflict among the elected branches of government.  Also 
known as decentralized agencies, these institutes are typically long-term grants of public 
authority that isolate specific functions of the state from the partisan politics endemic in 
the central state apparatus.  These agencies often have constitutional status or special 
organic laws.  They include state corporations, public banks, regulatory commissions, 
and social policy institutes to administer pensions, health care, and related programs.   
The establishment of autonomous electoral court systems throughout the 
twentieth century is one of the best examples of this type of statecraft.  Though classical 
constitutional theory made the executive responsible for organizing elections and 
                                                 
36  J. Mark Payne / Daniel Zovatto / Fernando Carrillo Flórez / Andrés Allamand Zavalla,  
Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America, Washington, D.C., 2002, p.  
215. 
37  See, Cecilia Martinez Gallardo, “Designing Cabinets: Presidents, Politics, and Policymaking in  
Latin America,” unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2005.  For a case study of  
Uruguay, see David Altman, “The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multi-Party  
Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay, 1989-99,” Party Politics, 6 (2000), pp. 259-83. 
38  Octavio Amorim Neto, “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet  
Formation in the Americas,” Comparative Political Studies, 39 (2006), forthcoming. 
39  David Epstein / Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to  
Policy Making under Separate Powers, Cambridge, 1999. 
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empowered the legislature to certify their results, incessant political conflict led parties to 
entrust “the electoral function” to a set of independent agencies and courts—thus 
establishing institutions based upon a new set of constitutional design principles.  Though 
framers first gave these bodies constitutional status with the Austrian (1920), 
Czechoslovakian (1920), and Greek (1927) constitutions, politicians and parties have 
most fully developed electoral commissions in Latin American countries.  Starting in 
Uruguay (1924), Chile (1925), and Costa Rica (1925-46), politicians in the region have 
removed the electoral function from the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  Electoral courts and other autonomous agencies therefore strike at the heart 
of the checks and balances version of the separation of powers.40   
Decentralization and Democratic Performance 
Debates about the merits of the old and new separation of powers only matter if 
alternative design principles have consequences.  If the new separation of powers is a 
superior principle of constitutional design, then it should empower governments that are 
more decisive, effective, and responsive to public opinion than political systems based 
upon checks and balances.  Though systematically assessing the merits of the old versus 
the new separation of powers is beyond the scope of this essay, I present some evidence 
in this section to suggest that the new separation of powers may have something to do 
with why Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have the best political systems in the region.  
Here I focus on the decentralized state sector, perhaps the single most significant way 
that separation of powers systems can overcome the conflict and partisanship at the core 
of the Madisonian vision of political power. 
Autonomous institutes proliferated in the twentieth century in Latin America, 
especially after the 1929 Great Depression.  Though their legal standing differs between 
and within countries, institutional engineers granted them legal independence so that they 
could pursue their mandates free of partisan interference.  Their budgets often are 
exempted from the normal lawmaking process and have earmarked sources of funding.  
With varying degrees of institutional independence, state corporations, for example, 
                                                 
40  Fabrice Lehoucq, “Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization,”  
International Political Science Review, 23 (2002), pp. 29-46.   
Visiting Resource Professor Papers LLILAS, The University of Texas at Austin http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/llilas/
 20
organized oil and gas production, telephones, electricity, water, and other public services.  
Other such institutions run pensions and health care.  Yet others run regulatory services.  
Constitutional reform and administrative reform often endowed Comptroller Generals 
with wide sweeping authority not only to review how agencies spent their monies, but 
also the power to interpret administrative laws and decrees.  Despite the restructuring of 
the state in the 1980s, the decentralized state sector remains an important part of the Latin 
American institutional landscape.   
Table 1 contains data on the relative size of the centralized and decentralized state 
sectors for selected years in 6 Latin American countries and in the United States.   
Table 1: Size of the Central and Decentralized State in Select Latin American Countries 
  As a Share of Public Sector Expenditures/GDP 
Country Year Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized
Argentina 1962 87% 13%   
Bolivia* 1970 27.8% 72.2% 10% 20% 
Brazil 1965 24.7% 75.3%   
Costa Rica 1968 51.2% 48.9% 15.8% 15.1% 
México 1967 51.4% 48.6% 13.3% 12.6% 
Venezuela 1967 67.8% 32.2%   
US** 1967 86.9% 13.1% 30% 5% 
Source: James W. Wilkie, “Recentralization: The Budgetary Dilemma in the Economic 
Development of Mexico, Bolivia, and Costa Rica,” in: James W. Wilkie (ed.) Statistics and 
National Policy, Los Angeles, 1974.  Columns 3 and 4 are from p. 103 and columns 5 and 6 from 
p. 126.   
*Last two columns are estimates for 1968. 
**Last two columns are an estimate based upon the public sector shares of the central and 
decentralized sectors and assuming that central state revenues = 35% of GDP. 
 
In Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico, autonomous institutes accounted for more 
than one-half of the public sector budget.  By 1970, there were 108 such agencies in 
Bolivia.41  By the 1990s, there were more than 119 autonomous institutions in Costa 
Rica.42  In Venezuela, there were more than 300.  Private law governs 294 of these 
                                                 
41  James W. Wilkie, “Recentralization: The Budgetary Dilemma in the Economic Development of  
Mexico, Bolivia, and Costa Rica,” in: James W. Wilkie (ed.), Statistics and National Policy, Los  
Angeles, 1974. 
42  Fabrice Lehoucq, Lucha electoral y sistema político en Costa Rica, 1948-1998, San José, 1997, 
pp. 36-9. 
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decentralized bodies in Venezuela while public law governs 68 of them.  In 1982, 
government-owned enterprises were responsible for almost 30 percent of GDP in 
Venezuela.43   
In contrast, decentralized agencies spent approximately 13 percent of the public 
sector budget in the US.  This is a figure comparable to that for Argentina, one of the 
several Latin American cases with a constitutional design most like that of the United 
States.  While the share of the decentralized sector is high in Mexico, it is the case that 
public law granted much less independence to decentralized agencies in this country than 
in political systems like Costa Rica based much more on the theory of functional 
specialization.  Moreover, informal relations between members of the hegemonic PRI 
kept all state agencies on a tight leash for most of the twentieth century.44  The Mexican 
case also helps to make the point that the centralization of political power can undermine 
the independence of formally decentralized agencies. 
There is evidence that functional specialization is related to superior democratic 
performance.  Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the number of years a country has been 
democratic and its international rank on the 2003 Bertelsmann Management Index 
(BMI).45  The BMI ranks a political system’s ability to pursue goals “strategically and 
consistently,” to use resources effectively, to build consensus around these goals, and to 
cooperate with international donors to promote market-compatible reforms and to fight 
for social justice.  With a correlation coefficient of -0.448, the scatterplot shows that 
experience with democratic government and political management are related.  More 
specifically, it reveals that the best states in Latin America—Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Uruguay—are also those that have relied upon creating bureaucratic agencies and of 
                                                 
43  Brian F. Crisp, Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan  
Politicians and Interest Groups, Stanford, 2000, p. 128. 
44  Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century,  
Berkeley, 2002, 308pp. 
45  Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003: Politische Gesaltung im  
Internationalen Vergleich, Gütersloh, 2004.  The estimate of years a country has been  
democratic is from Smith cited in footnote 1.
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horizontal accountability largely outside of the central state to isolate them from the 
partisan bickering of the elected branches of government.   
 
 Figure 1: Political Management and Democratic Experience in Latin America 
  













































Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003: Politische 
Gesaltung im Internationalen Vergleich, Gütersloh, 2004 and Peter H. Smith, “Los ciclos  
de la democracia en América Latina”, Política y Gobierno, 11 (2004), p. 200. 
 
 
Uruguay seems to have been the first country where central state politicians began 
creating what they called Autonomous Entities.  In 1918, voters approved a constitution 
that gave the Autonomous Entities a place in the Uruguayan constitutional order.  The 
1934 constitution established different types of autonomous agencies, some of whose 
budgets did not require legislative approval.  The president named the Directors of the 
Autonomous Entities, subject to approval by the Senate, and involving candidates from 
government and opposition parties.46  Chile followed suite in the wake of the 1925 
constitution, which called for the decentralization of public administration.  By mid-
century, the Chilean public sector boasted a panoply of decentralized agencies that 
                                                 
46  Héctor Gros Espiell, Evolución constitucional del Uruguay, Montevideo, 2003, pp. 89-90. 
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included the Corporation for the Promotion of Production (CORFO) and a powerful 
Comptroller General.  The Comptroller General was a widely respected and independent 
agency that not only audited public accounts, but could also declare executive decrees 
unconstitutional.47
Politicians started creating autonomous institutes in Costa Rica in 1915, when the 
central state created a central bank to deal with the cutoff of exports to Germany during 
World War I.  Granting them formal autonomy was part of the 1949 Constituent 
Assembly’s broader effort to depoliticize many of the functions of government.  Perhaps 
the most prominent of these is the Board of National Social Security, founded in 1943.  
By the 1990s, this institution provided medical care for nearly 68 percent of the salaried 
and unsalaried EAP and their families.48  Other social welfare institutions include the 
Children's Hospital (1964), the Mixed Institute of Social Assistance (1971), the National 
Institute of Housing and Urban Issues (1954) and the National Ward for the Blind (1957).    
A more disaggregated look at decentralized agencies suggests that some have 
performed better than others.  In general, state corporations have not performed very well 
in Latin America.49  Part of the problem was a shortage of funds, in part because their 
rates were politically determined.  State corporations often behaved like predictable 
monopolists and, as a result, extracted rents that were shared between private suppliers, 
union officials (and members), and central government officials.  Not infrequently, 
interest groups, typically in association with state officials (policy triangles), captured 
these bodies along with those of regulatory agencies. 
Electoral tribunals have performed much better.  Electoral tribunals helped to 
consolidate democracy in Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay by preventing the partisan 
manipulation of election administration and vote tallies.50  Concentrating the electoral 
                                                 
47  Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, Baltimore, 1978, pp. 13-6.   
Also, see Frederico Gil, The Political System of Chile, Boston, 1966, pp. 97-99. 
48  Proyecto del Estado de la Nación, Estado de la Nación, 2004, San José, p. 403. 
49  Alberto Chong / Florencio López-de-Silanes (eds.) Privatization in Latin America: Myths  
and Reality, Stanford, 2005. 
50  Fabrice Lehoucq / Iván Molina, Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and  
Democratization in Costa Rica, Cambridge, 2002, 294pp.  
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function in an electoral court system also helped to depoliticize electoral governance in 
other countries of the region, even though military coups often made their work 
irrelevant.  Only when an electoral management body and a set of courts took over 
responsibility for elections in Mexico did government and opposition parties agree to 
accept the results of increasingly competitive elections in the 1990s.51  A statistical 
analysis of Latin American elections between 1980 and 2000 shows that electoral 
tribunals did lead to fairer elections, as judged by international observers, and more 
compliance with election outcomes.52  To the extent that electoral tribunals had the 
independence and resources to organize elections and to count the ballots, elections were 
fairer and less likely to provoke post-election conflicts. 
Conclusions and Implications
This essay began by noting that the political systems of Latin America have not 
always maximized individual liberty nor been very effective.  For half of the twentieth 
century, Latin Americans, on average, have lived in dictatorships of one type or another.  
Though there are some exemplary cases of democratic governance in Latin America, all 
too many citizens of the region have been stuck with authoritarian, unstable and/or bad 
government.  
In this essay, I have explored the impact of institutional factors on the political 
development of the region.  I argue that constitutional design may very well be an 
important source of political instability, poorly implemented policies, and the collapse of 
democratic government.  By constitutional design, I mean the principles that political 
systems use to assign the functions of government to the different parts of government.  
So, my argument in this essay does not simply refer to the longstanding debate about the 
advantages of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, which concludes that 
presidential systems are more unstable than parliamentary ones, though the causal 
                                                 
51  Todd A. Eisenstadt, Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions 
Cambridge, 2004, 354pp. 
52  Jonathan Hartlyn / Jennifer McCoy / Thomas J. Mustillo, “The ‘Quality of Elections’ in  
Contemporary Latin America: Issues in Measurement and Explanation”, Paper prepared for  
delivery at the XXIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas,  
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mechanisms for the instability of presidential systems are not entirely clear.  Policy 
paralysis and ideological polarization between the branches of government are plausible 
causes of regime breakdown, but the limited empirical tests to date do not permit 
concluding that either is the cause for the brittleness of presidential systems.  I 
hypothesize that a broader conception of institutional arrangements, one that focuses on 
design principles helps us to understand why so many separation of powers systems have 
performed less than admirably. 
One conclusion of this paper is that the political systems of Latin America are 
alternative combinations of two of the three dominant models of constitutional design.  
With a few minor traces, parliamentary sovereignty has not structured the relations 
among the parts of government in the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries of the 
region.  State structures are neither delegates of a popularly elected assembly, nor have 
legislatures been the dominant branch of government in Latin America.  Instead, states 
are different combinations of the old and new separation of powers.  The existence of 
executives and legislatures elected independently elected of each other is a vestige of 
checks and balances theory of statecraft.  That both share responsibility over the 
production of laws is the most concrete manifestation that the old separation of powers is 
alive in Latin America.  Yet, many separation of powers systems have created institutions 
based upon the theory of functional specialization, which is at the core of the new 
separation of powers.  Instead of making 2 or more parts of government responsible for 
important functions of government, institutional engineers have created autonomous 
agencies to isolate key policymaking responsibilities from the incessant conflict of the 
two elected branches of government.  Since the 1930s, most political systems of the 
region have, in fact, created a large number of independent and/or quasi-independent 
agencies to run auditing agencies, administer pensions and health care programs, and to 
organize and to hold elections. 
The second conclusion of this paper is that successful governance in the region 
stems from converting, as much as possible, of the old into the new separation of powers.  
The 3 most successful cases of democratic governance in the region are Chile, Costa 
Rica, and Uruguay, 3 countries in which presidents and legislatures devolved important 
policymaking functions to agencies of the decentralized state sector.  In this essay, I 
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suggest that isolating government functions from the elected branches of government 
helped both the stability and quality of democracy.  By depriving the central state of 
important responsibilities, the establishment of autonomous agencies reduced the scope 
of conflict among the elected branches of government.  Administrative decentralization 
also contributed to political system effectiveness by detaching policymaking from the 
electoral calendar that drives so much of central state behavior.  As a result, the new 
separation of powers may very well help to explain the uncommon success of several 
presidential systems in Latin America. 
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